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Female combatants play a central role in rebel efforts to cultivate and disseminate
positive narratives regarding the movement and its political goals. Yet, the effec-
tiveness of such strategies in shaping audience attitudes or generating tangible
benefits for the group remains unclear. We propose and test a theory regarding the
channels through which female fighters advance rebel goals. We argue that female
fighters positively influence audience attitudes toward rebel groups by strengthening
observers’ beliefs about their legitimacy and their decision to use armed tactics. We
further contend that these effects directly help them secure support from trans-
national nonstate actors and indirectly promote state support. We assess our
arguments by combining a novel survey experiment in two countries with analyses of
new cross-national data on female combatants and information about transnational
support for rebels. The empirical results support our arguments and demonstrate
the impact of gender framing on rebel efforts to secure support.
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Women represent a small proportion of armed combatants in contemporary rebel-
lions. Indeed, recent cross-national studies suggest that female combatants are pres-
ent in only about one-third of armed resistance movements (Henshaw 2017; Thomas
and Bond 2015; Wood and Thomas 2017).1 Nonetheless, gender framing and images
of female combatants are prevalent in rebel propaganda and public outreach efforts.
This appears to be true among rebel groups that recruit large numbers of female
fighters as well those in which women constitute only a small proportion of the
combatants. In El Salvador, for example, the large-scale participation of female
fighters in the Frente Farabundo Martı´ para la Liberacio´n Nacional (FMLN) were
central to the group’s efforts to cultivate a positive and sympathetic image (Viterna
2014). Similarly, the leadership of Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) coordinated with
Western journalists to emphasize the contributions of its (comparatively few) female
participants in order to draw attention to its independence struggle against the
Indonesian government (Barter 2014, 70). Numerous other rebel movements with
diverse political goals and ideologies, including anti-colonial rebellions in Southern
Africa, armed separatist movements in the Middle East, and sectarian insurgencies
in Western Europe have likewise incorporated images or narratives of female fight-
ers into their propaganda materials, suggesting that they are aware of their symbolic
power.
In this article, we explore the intentional use of gender frames by rebel groups as
well as the consequences of such efforts. We argue that rebel efforts to emphasize
women’s contribution to the movement assist them in garnering support from trans-
national nonstate actors (TNSAs), such as solidarity networks, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and activist communities based in foreign states. Securing
support from such groups can generate both direct benefits, such as the provision of
material and economic resources to the group, and indirect benefits, including advo-
cacy and lobbying efforts aimed at shaping the position of governments toward the
conflict. Our argument therefore builds on existing literature that critically analyzes
the symbolic power of gender during wartime (e.g., Bayard de Volo 2001; Viterna
2014) and extends the arguments and findings from the very small number of recent
studies that considers the potential strategic implications of women’s participation in
armed political organizations (e.g., Karim 2019; Wood 2019).
We rely on a diverse set of empirical strategies to assess the validity of our
arguments. First, we draw on original survey experiments in the United States and
Indonesia to examine the impact of female combatants on audience attitudes. The
results provide direct evidence that audiences in distinct sociocultural contexts are
more likely to view a group’s goals and their use of violence to attain those goals as
legitimate when they are aware of the presence of female combatants in the group. In
addition, we empirically identify a potential mechanism for this effect: audiences
perceive female fighters as comparatively less motivated by self-interest than their
male counterparts. We then assess the broader implications of these findings for
conflict dynamics. Using a cross-national sample of contemporary armed rebellions,
we analyze the relationship between the presence of female combatants and rebel
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success in acquiring external support. Consistent with our argument (and our experi-
mental results), we find that rebel groups that include female combatants are more
likely to receive external support from TNSAs, such as NGOs, solidarity organiza-
tions, and diaspora groups than those without women in the combat force. Our
results further suggest that the presence of female combatants may exert some
influence on state sponsorship decisions, but this effect is indirect and occurs pre-
dominantly through its influence on TNSA support.
Our study contributes to the existing literature in several key ways. Most
directly, it advances scholarship on the use and impact of gender frames in armed
conflict (e.g., Bayard de Volo 2001; Loken 2018; Viterna 2014) by articulating a
theory that explicitly links the use of these frames to observable strategic benefits
and by empirically evaluating their effects on their intended audiences. Our anal-
yses also address important theoretical and empirical gaps by elucidating the
microfoundations of the relationship between the presence of female combatants
and the accrual of tangible strategic benefits. In particular, they demonstrate an
important direct connection between the presence of female combatants and TNSA
support, and it identifies a previously overlooked indirect link between these
fighters and external state support for the rebel’s cause. Finally, our study is among
the first to empirically validate the claims that female fighters can influence
audience attitudes and deliver strategic benefits to the armed groups that employ
them and the only study to examine these effects across diverse sociopolitical
contexts and at different levels of analysis.
We first discuss the important role of nonstate external support for armed rebel-
lion, focusing particularly on the ways in which rebels employ strategic frames and
narratives to solicit foreign support. In the subsequent section, we draw on prior
literature examining the use of gender frames by rebel groups to develop testable
hypotheses regarding the impact of these frames on external audience attitudes. We
then connect the arguments outlined in the previous two sections by describing how
the positive influence of female combatants translates into support from TNSAs.
Next, we describe our multimethod research design and present the results of the
survey experiments followed by the cross-national analyses. We then briefly con-
sider whether the presence of female fighters might generate backlash or undermine
support in some contexts. We conclude by summarizing the primary contributions of
the findings and offering suggestion for how they might inform future research on
this topic.
External Support for Armed Rebellions
Resources provided by foreign sponsors and allies are essential to the survival and
success of many contemporary armed resistance movements. In order to secure such
support, rebel groups routinely undertake concerted diplomatic and public outreach
efforts (e.g., Huang 2016; Jo 2015; Jones and Mattiacci 2019). To date, the scholar-
ship on foreign support for rebels has focused almost exclusively on the factors
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motivating government support and the consequences of this patronage (Bapat
2012; Salehyan 2009; Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011; San-Akca
2016). Though typically overlooked by existing scholarship, rebel groups routi-
nely solicit assistance from external nonstate actors as well. TNSAs represent an
important source of external assistance for many rebellions, and there is at least
some evidence that their support can influence the dynamics of the conflict (Pet-
rova 2019).
Despite the limited attention given to TNSA support for rebellions, numerous
existing studies have demonstrated the importance of their support for dissident
movements more broadly. Most notably, Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) research on
transnational activism illustrates how support from sympathetic constituencies and
organizations in influential foreign countries can assist dissenting groups in
achieving their political objectives. TNSAs can disseminate information about the
group and its cause, mobilize public support in third-party states, and shape opi-
nions of relevant external political actors (e.g., states and inter-governmental
organizations (IGOs). Ultimately, the actions of TNSAs increase the odds that
these actors undertake diplomatic or even military intervention on behalf of the
dissident movement (e.g., Murdie and Peksen 2013).
The core features of this model readily extend to the context of violent rebellions.
Rebel movements have often solicited support from external nonstate actors, includ-
ing social movements, NGOs, foreign political parties, international organizations,
global religious movements, and diaspora communities (Bob 2005; Jo 2015). In
many cases, rebel movements—or the political organizations of which they are a
part—successfully attain support from TNSA. Most TNSAs engage in nonviolent
advocacy efforts; yet, even those advancing human rights and social justice causes
are willing to extend support to armed groups if they perceive their violence as
legitimate or view armed resistance as the only effective means of challenging a
repressive government. For example, the Southwest African People’s Organization
(SWAPO) in Namibia, People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola, the Eje´r-
cito Zapitista de Liberacio´n Nacional (EZLN) in Mexico, and the FMLN each
enjoyed support from progressive NGOs and political solidarity movements in the
United States and Western Europe despite their decision to use armed struggle to
advance their goals.
The benefits TNSAs provide to armed resistance movements are broadly similar
to those they extend to nonviolent activist groups and include both direct and indirect
forms of support (Bob 2005; Saleyhan 2009, 32-34). Direct support takes the form of
material or economic resources provide to the armed group, most commonly to its
political wing. For instance, in addition to its efforts to raise public awareness about
anti-colonial struggles in sub-Saharan Africa, the US-based African Liberation Sup-
port Committee also provided financial support to various armed movements (John-
son 2003, 490-91). Indirect assistance to rebel groups is more common and often
takes the form of public information campaigns and lobbying efforts targeting the
governments of the states in which the TNSAs and its membership are located. For
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instance, the Namibia Support Committee, a London-based NGO, worked to raise
public awareness of SWAPO’s armed resistance to South African occupation of
Namibia, lobbied the British government to support the group’s cause, and orga-
nized boycotts of South African companies (Saunders 2009). Similarly, during the
1970s and 1980s numerous transnational solidarity movements in Western Europe
and the United States mobilized public support for revolutionary organizations in
Central America and in some cases developed explicit connections to armed
groups such as the FMLN (Christiaens 2014; Perla 2008). TNSAs can also pressure
their governments to adopt policies that benefit rebel movements, including dip-
lomatic efforts to resolve the conflict, provision of humanitarian assistance to the
rebel group’s civilian constituency, or punitive policies directed toward incumbent
regime. These indirect efforts may be particularly useful where the states’ strategic
interests alone would be insufficient for inducing support for the rebels. In these
circumstances, attaining TNSA support can provide a conduit for soliciting state
support.
To solicit the support of TNSAs, rebel movements must appeal to foreign audi-
ences who typically have no personal connection to the movement or its cause and
who are geographically removed from the conflict. Rebel groups therefore adopt a
variety of strategies for raising external audience awareness increasing the salience
of the conflict (Bob 2005, 22-24). First, they can make explicit appeals to target
audiences and cultivate direct relationships with (potentially) sympathetic NGOs or
other activist groups. They might also rely on international media (and increasingly
social media) to distribute important information about the group’s cause, motiva-
tions, and goals (Jones and Mattiacci 2019; Trisko-Darden, Henshaw, and Szekely
2019). For example, the EZLN in Mexico, YPG in Syria, and the Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia in Colombia have adeptly utilized these channels to
disseminate information and garner international attention.
In addition, rebels soliciting support must successfully convince potential spon-
sors and advocates to devote a portion of their (often scarce) resources to the group’s
cause. They therefore strive to package and promote their movement in ways that
demonstrate the legitimacy of the group’s goals, garner sympathy for the movement
and its members, and delegitimize their opposition. Strategic frames that appeal to
the target audience are key tools for doing so (Benford and Snow 2000). For exam-
ple, dissident groups often seek to juxtapose the repression and violence perpetrated
by the incumbent regime with their own commitment to human rights and demo-
cratic norms. Such frames allow the group to demonstrate that its values align with
those of the potential sponsor and help it to engage the sympathies of a wide range of
international audiences, particularly in developed countries (Bob 2005; Jo 2015).
However, the prevalence of strategic frames focused on injustice and abuse can
make it difficult for observers to assess the legitimacy of such claims or to differ-
entiate among claimants, thereby limiting their effectiveness.
Strategic frames that concisely but vividly signal the group’s legitimacy can help
distinguish it from the many other causes competing for attention in a crowded
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global marketplace, and compelling narratives generate attention and sympathy
from potential supporters. Effective frames not only highlight the injustice of the
conditions that an opposition group seeks to remedy but also clearly differentiate its
values from those of its antagonist (e.g., the state) and highlight characteristics of the
movement that engage target audiences on a visceral or emotional level (Benford
and Snow 2000). As we discuss in the following section, gender frames—particu-
larly rebel efforts to emphasize women’s participation—represent an effective tool
for attracting audience attention, garnering observer sympathy, and signaling the
virtue of the group (Loken 2018; Viterna 2014). Ultimately, we expect that such
frames, and the visible presence of female fighters in a group more generally,
increase the likelihood that it successfully acquires support from transnational acti-
vist movements and NGOs.
Gender Frames and Imagery in Armed Conflict
The use of gender frames is common during periods of armed conflict. Gov-
ernments, national militaries, armed resistance movements, and NGOs all rou-
tinely employ gendered imagery and narratives in an effort to manipulate the
beliefs, attitudes, and actions of target audiences (Carpenter 2005; Elshtain
1987; Goldstein 2001). Unlike those used by many other actors, which tend
to portray women as innocent victims of war, the gender frames rebels adopt
often depict women as active participants in political violence. Most visibly
perhaps, rebel propaganda materials in a diverse array of conflicts have included
the image of a young female guerrilla carrying a rifle over her shoulder (and
often a baby in her arms; Goldstein 2001; Loken 2018).2 The propaganda value
of such imagery is rarely a key motivation for women’s recruitment; rather, the
use of images and narratives highlighting women’s contributions as fighters
represent an effort to garner attention, sympathy, and support from specific
audiences.
The success rate of these efforts is understudied and therefore remains unclear.
Nonetheless, existing research provides theoretical insights into the potential influ-
ence of these frames on observer perceptions. Such studies contend that the symbolic
power of rebel efforts to showcase women’s participation stems from the challenge it
presents to observers’ expectations about armed conflict and the motivations of its
participants. Deeply entrenched gender norms and stereotypes in most societies
implicitly associate women with peacefulness, vulnerability, and innocence and men
with aggression and violence (Elshtain 1987; Sjoberg 2010). Images that juxtapose
women’s assumed roles as pacifistic mothers and caregivers with their observed
roles as fighters therefore become a potent propaganda instrument and a powerful
strategy through which rebel groups can shape their public image (Bayard de Volo
2001, 42-43; Viterna 2014, 192).
The presence of women in combat roles—as opposed to their simple presence in
the organization—is central to these efforts. The roles women undertake in rebel
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movements vary substantially across groups (Trisko-Darden, Henshaw, and Szekely
2019). Yet, in most groups, the allocation of these roles (and their perceived pres-
tige) is highly gendered. While women are often willing to take up arms, the roles to
which they are assigned routinely reflect the gender-based divisions of labor pre-
valent in broader society (Thomas and Wood 2018; Viterna 2013). Thus, female
rebels typically assume noncombat roles such as cooks, nurses, porters, and recrui-
ters. The relative scarcity of female combatants and their marked deviation from the
societal status quo makes their presence notable and renders them symbolically
meaningful to observers. By contrast, because the noncombat roles women assume
largely mirror their traditional roles in society, they are comparatively less notice-
able and less salient to observers. This observation may help explain why the over-
whelming majority of rebel propaganda materials featuring women catalogued in
recent studies depict them carrying firearms (Loken 2018; Wood 2019).
Women’s contributions to the rebellion can influence audience perceptions of the
group through several interrelated mechanisms. Prior studies suggest that the pres-
ence of female combatants signal both the severity of the conflict and the moral
necessity of the rebel’s cause by implying that even society’s “most pacifistic”
members have been forced to take up arms (Sjoberg 2010; Viterna 2014). Addition-
ally, media reports frequently frame female fighters as selfless defenders of their
families and their communities who have resorted to violence only as a last resort
(Toivanen and Baser 2016). Such framing may incline observers to believe that
female combatants are motivated less by ideology or self-interest and more by
altruistic goals such as the defense of their children or other vulnerable segments
of society (Cunningham 2009).
For similar reasons, audiences may view female combatants as emblematic of the
sacrifices made by the group’s members and a signal of their resolve for achieving
the goals. An inherent tension exists between motherhood and political violence, and
women who join armed groups are often viewed as having foregone their “natural”
maternal roles in the service of the group’s goals (A˚ha¨il 2012; Bayard de Volo
2001). Audiences are therefore likely to perceive female fighters as heroic, sympa-
thetic figures, precisely because of the sacrifices they are believed to have made on
the group’s behalf (Stack-O’Connor 2007; Viterna 2014). In this sense, their pres-
ence in the ranks may also serve as a form of costly signal of the membership’s
commitment to the group’s goals.
Rebels’ leaders are often cognizant of these potential benefits. For example, the
LTTE’s relied on female fighters to help challenge the government’s claim that it
was a narrow, violent extremist group and to promote the alternative narrative that it
was a legitimate, broad-based social movement (Alison 2009, 125). Likewise, the
FMLN used the (perceived) innocence and vulnerability of its female fighters to
frame its rebellion as righteous while simultaneously linking the brutality of the
Salvadoran government to women’s support for the rebels (Viterna 2014). Media
coverage of female combatants, which tends to focus on the circumstances that
motivated women’s participation and frames their involvement in violence as
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exceptional (e.g., Toivanen and Baser 2016; Yarchi 2014), reinforces these percep-
tions among observers. Consequently, efforts to highlight female fighters, whether
advanced intentionally by rebels or inadvertently by journalists, may humanize the
movement and its fighters and positively influence observer perceptions of its goals.
Female Combatants and Audience Attitudes
The studies summarized above have adeptly critiqued the role of gender imagery in
rebel propaganda and described how rebels use it to construct and propagate a
positive narrative. However, the hypothesized effects of female fighters on audi-
ences have largely been assumed and rarely evaluated empirically. In addition,
existing works rarely identify the target audiences for these efforts or explain how
their attitudes might transform into actions that benefit the rebel group. Addressing
these theoretical and empirical gaps, we focus on the attitudes of external audiences,
which are often important targets of rebel propaganda efforts. Moreover, as we show
in the following section, the opinions of external audiences can sometimes translate
into strategic benefits for the rebels. While not the focus of our study, we touch
briefly on the question of domestic audience attitudes in the conclusion.
Few studies have explicitly examined how audiences construct attitudes toward
armed groups in foreign countries. However, recent experimental evidence suggests
that group-level characteristics and behaviors can shape international audience per-
ceptions (Arves, Cunningham, and McCulloch 2019; Flynn and Stewart 2018). In
particular, Western audiences appear to hold a more positive view of rebels that
engage in nonviolent resistance campaigns, avoid violence against civilians, provide
social services, and demonstrate a commitment to democracy. We contend the
presence of female fighters represents an additional characteristic that positively
influences external audience perceptions.
According to the literature surveyed in the previous section, the relative rarity of
female combatants and embedded beliefs about women’s reasons for participating in
organized violence may render female combatants salient, easily identifiable, and
sympathetic figures. Importantly, audiences do not observe female combatants in
isolation. Rather, through their propaganda efforts rebels seek to link the women its
ranks to the group and the cause for which they fight. As noted above, media
coverage of female combatants tends to focus on the context that motivated their
participation. Consequently, we contend that observers transfer their beliefs about
women’s motivations for joining the rebellion and their intuitive impressions of
female fighters to the group as a whole. Existing evidence of such transference is
sparse; however, one recent study found that individuals in a postconflict society
who encountered female security agents expressed greater confidence in the coun-
try’s security forces (Karim 2019). We expect a similar effect in the context of
external observers. In essence, external audiences use the presence of female fighters
as a heuristic for making inferences about the legitimacy of the group’s cause and the
justification of its use of violence to achieve its goals.
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From these arguments, we derive a set of empirical expectations regarding the
relationship between female fighters and external audience evaluations of armed
resistance movements. First, we expect the presence of female combatants to attract
observer attention and pique interest in the conflict. Second, we anticipate that the
presence of female combatants will incline observers toward perceiving the group’s
cause and its decision to resort to violence as legitimate. Finally, we derive a
hypothesis related to a primary mechanism by which female fighters shape observer
attitudes. Specifically, we anticipate observers attribute different, “purer” motiva-
tions to female fighters than to their male counterparts. We formalize these expec-
tations as follows:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The visible presence of female fighters increases observer
interest in the conflict.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The visible presence of female fighters increases observer
perceptions of the legitimacy of the group’s goals and its decision to use
violence to attain them.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Observers believe that the motives of female fighters
differ from those of male fighters.
Audience Attitudes and Transnational Support
Above we built on the existing literature to postulate identifiable links between the
presence of female combatants and foreign audience perception of the group for
which they fight. What remains unexplained is how the influence of female comba-
tants on audience attitudes translates into observable behaviors that can potentially
benefit armed groups. We argue that the presence of female combatants is most
likely to influence the actions of TNSAs such as solidarity movements and NGOs,
increasing both their direct support to rebel movements and the likelihood that they
will pressure their governments to provide support as well.
Rebel movements solicit support from a variety of external audiences. State
governments possess the most abundant resources to commit to foreign conflicts,
thus incentivizing armed groups to engage in direct diplomacy with them (Huang
2016). Yet, state decisions regarding foreign intervention and sponsorship are typi-
cally dominated by geostrategic interests rather than normative concerns (e.g., Bapat
2012; San-Akca 2016). While ideological affinity with a foreign rebel groups and
sympathy for its goals plays a role in sponsorship decisions (San-Akca 2016), these
decisions are typically filtered through a strategic lens. Rebel efforts to highlight the
presence of female combatants are therefore unlikely to have a direct influence on
state support. Nonetheless, because transnational support often influences state
sponsorship (e.g., Salehyan, Gelditsch, and Cunningham 2011), female combatants
may exert an indirect influence on these decisions.
Rebel movements also engage in outreach to foreign publics more broadly (Flynn
and Stewart 2018). This may occur indirectly via international media coverage or
1646 Journal of Conflict Resolution 64(9)
when rebels disseminate propaganda directly via traditional or social media. Con-
sistent with the discussion in the previous section, various armed groups, including
the FMLN, GAM, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and Yekıˆneyeˆn Para-
stina Jin/Yekıˆneyeˆn Parastina Gel (YPJ/YPG), have adeptly used these platforms to
emphasize the presence of female fighters. Yet, even where these efforts succeed in
garnering the attention and sympathy of foreign citizens, public sentiment is often
difficult to transform into concrete action. NGOs and solidarity organizations can
help overcome these challenges by harnessing audience sentiment and channeling it
toward a specific cause or organization. TNSAs therefore represent an important
conduit for the expression of public attitudes and a meaningful way for citizens to
coordinate support for distant causes.
The use of gendered narrative and propaganda featuring images of female com-
batants advances these efforts in several important ways. First, the presence of
female fighters piques observer interest and helps differentiate those rebellions from
exclusively male rebel groups, which are more likely to conform to observers’
preexisting beliefs. Second, to the extent that gendered symbolism resonates with
a diverse array of audiences, we expect that the leadership and members of many
TNSAs are also likely to react positively to the presence of female combatants.
Third, the presence of female combatants—and their potential resonance with the
public—may appeal to rationally self-interested TNSAs. TNSA leaders are eager to
expand their resource base and thus devote substantial time to fundraising and
membership drives (Carpenter 2005). These strategic considerations partly deter-
mine the specific actors that these groups choose to support. Given a set of foreign
groups with similar causes, resource constrained TNSAs are likely to advocate on
behalf of those groups they are most marketable to members and potential donors.
Activist networks frequently employ gender frames because they have a powerful
impact on audience awareness and attitudes and can help increase their willingness
to donate time and financial resources in support of the cause (Carpenter 2005).
Consequently, we anticipate that NGOs and other activist groups will be more likely
to advocate on behalf of rebel movements that include female combatants because,
compared to other similar armed groups, they represent the causes perceived as most
sympathetic and appealing.
Based on this discussion, we expect TNSAs to support causes that resonate with
the wider public. Given our previous arguments linking female fighters to audience
beliefs about armed group legitimacy, we posit that female fighters increase the
likelihood that the group receives support from transnational activist groups. We
propose a direct relationship between female combatant and TNSA support. How-
ever, we contend that any relationship between female combatants and state sup-
port will be indirect. More specifically, the effect on state support depends on the
role of female combatants in mobilizing support from TNSAs. Formally, we
hypothesize:
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Hypothesis 4 (H4a): The visible presence of female fighters increases the
likelihood that a rebel group secures support from TNSAs.
Hypothesis 4 (H4b): The effects of female fighters on state support are
moderated by TNSA support such that they only increase state support in the
presence of TNSA support.
Research Method
We adopt a multimethod approach that leverages experimental and observational
data to evaluate our hypotheses. We first conduct survey experiments in two differ-
ent settings, allowing us to test our claims regarding the effects of female combatants
on audience interest and perceptions of the legitimacy of the group’s goals and
tactics (H1, H2, and H3). To explore the broader implications of these findings,
we then use a recently constructed data set on women’s participation in armed
rebellions as well as data on external support for rebel movements to analyze the
direct relationship between female combat participation and support provided by
TNSAs (H4a) and the indirect linkage between female combatants and state support
(H4b). For clarity, we discuss each empirical approach as well as the relevant results
in separate sections.
Survey Experiments
Case selection: The United States and Indonesia. In order to examine the validity of
our first three hypotheses, we fielded online survey experiments in the United
States and Indonesia using Qualtrics panels.3 We deployed the survey to the US
sample (n ¼ 792) in July 2018 and to the Indonesian sample in September 2018
(n ¼ 754).4 The treatment and outcome measures are identical across the two
samples. Questions were translated into Indonesian for the Indonesia sample.5
Summary statistics of the samples are reported in the second section of the
supporting information.6
We deployed our survey in these diverse contexts in order to enhance external
validity and to guard against the influence of country-specific characteristics that
might bias our results. The argument we develop is general and assumes that the
association between men and violence/aggression and women and peacefulness/
innocence are observed cross-nationally. Nevertheless, we recognize that the
strength and influence of gender stereotypes vary across social and cultural contexts
(Wood and Eagly 2002). Consequently, female fighters may potentially provoke
backlash among some audiences. We empirically investigate this possibility later in
the article.
Beyond differences in gender stereotypes, audiences may react differently to the
presence of female fighters depending on their prior exposure to political violence. It
is perhaps one thing to take interest in female participation in distant conflicts, and
quite another to support such participation close to home. To account for these
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possibilities, we choose a relatively hard case on which to test whether our argument
travels beyond the United States, which differs both in gender norms and in prior
experience with internal conflict.
The United States is a high-income, highly educated, secular Western country;
Indonesia, by contrast, is a lower middle-income, non-Western country with a gen-
erally less educated and more religiously devout Muslim-majority population. We
therefore anticipate that the strength of traditional gender stereotypes would be
greater in the latter than in the former. This assumption is generally supported by
ethnographic evidence on the strength of traditionalist values in Indonesian society
(e.g., Noerdin 2002). Indonesia also differs markedly from the United States in its
experience of violent civil conflict. While the United States has a long history of
civilian democratic rule and only a distant history of internal armed conflict, Indo-
nesia only recently emerged from autocratic rule by a military dictator and has
recently experienced two large-scale separatist conflicts: Aceh (1999–2005) and
East Timor (1999–2002).7
Experimental design. Our experiment consisted of a simulated news article describing
a fictional separatist rebel group and its conflict with the government of the country
to which the independence-seeking region was stated to belong.8 Participants were
randomly assigned to an article that described a mixed-gender rebel group or to one
including references to male combatants only.9 A similar photo of a male or female
fighter accompanied the articles. The vignette states:
For the past several months, a rebel group with a fighting force of several thousand
[men/men and women] has been engaged in a violent struggle against its country’s
government. The group accuses the government of discrimination and violent repres-
sion against its people and seeks to establish an independent homeland that will guar-
antee their basic rights and freedoms. To date, the conflict has caused hundreds of
deaths and forced thousands to flee from their homes.
A recent Newsweek article profiling the conflict interviewed [Ayan/Ayana], one
such fighter. [Ayan/Ayana] explained that [he/she] joined the rebels after [his wife/
her husband] and daughter were killed in a government attack on [his/her] village.
[He/She] added that since joining the group, [he/she] has only become more commit-
ted to the cause, and [he/she] will continue to fight until [his/her] people gain inde-
pendence, freedom, and security.
The experiment provides a relatively hard test for the theory. In reality, media
coverage and rebel propaganda materials tend to highlight (or exaggerate) the
“feminine” characteristics of female combatants. Common examples include images
of female combatants alongside children (especially with babies in their arms),
pictures of smiling female fighters juxtaposed with those of their more stoic male
counterparts, or narrative descriptions of their physical attractiveness. To preserve
the validity of our experimental design, we manipulate only the biological sex of the
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fighter, without layering on additional gendered imagery. We briefly discuss the
potential implications of this decision below.10
We examine three dependent variables. The first, interest, is based on responses
to the following question: “How likely would you be to read an article about a
conflict like this if you came across it in the news?” Second, we asked respondents
to what extent they believed that the group’s goal of an independent homeland was
legitimate (legitimacy: goals). Third, we asked to what extent respondents believed
the group’s tactic of armed struggle to attain its goals was legitimate (legitimacy:
tactics). All three questions were measured on a five-point scale.
Results from survey experiments. We present the mean levels of interest, support for
group goals, and support for group tactics across treatment groups in Table 1.11 We
find that in both samples the presence of female fighters has a small positive effect
on respondent interest. This effect approaches conventional levels of statistical
significance (p ¼ .09), providing some (albeit weak) support for H1. Turning to
effect of the treatment on respondent perceptions of the legitimacy of the group’s
separatist goals, the results in Table 1 reveal some differences between the US and
Indonesia samples. In the US sample, the presence of female fighters leads to
significantly stronger support for the rebel group’s goals. In the Indonesia sample,
however, we do not find differences in support for the goal of independence. More
Table 1. Attitudes toward Rebel Groups.
US Sample
Mean
ATE T-statisticControl (All Male) Treatment (Female)
Interest in group 3.70 3.80 .10 1.35*
Legitimacy of goals 3.72 3.86 .14 2.22**
Violence legitimate 3.54 3.65 .12 1.87**
Indonesia Sample
Mean
ATE T-statisticControl (All Male) Treatment (Female)
Interest in group 4.02 4.11 .09 1.34*
Legitimacy of goals 3.07 3.10 .03 0.30
Violence legitimate 2.88 3.05 .17 1.81**
Note: Mean score denotes the average view of respondents on a scale of 1 (very low) to 5 (very high).
N ¼ 792 for US sample; 754 for Indonesia sample.
*p < .10.
**p < .05 (one-tailed tests).
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generally, we find considerably lower levels of support for the insurgency among
respondents in the Indonesia sample compared to the American sample. This dif-
ference is perhaps not surprising the experience of violent separatist conflicts in East
Timor and Aceh may diminish Indonesian respondents’ sympathy for such demands
regardless of the narrative a group advances. Similarly, Indonesian respondents are
generally less likely to view armed rebellion as a legitimate method for the group to
pursue its goals. Nonetheless, the presence of female fighters significantly increases
support for armed tactics in both samples. This result likewise supports H2.
Our experimental results suggest that, across diverse empirical contexts, the
visible presence of female fighters exerts a positive influence on external obser-
ver attitudes toward an armed group. We believe these results underestimate the
effect size of exposure to female combatants outside the experimental setting for
two reasons. First, to isolate the causal effects of female fighters, we manipulate
biological sex only, which is a subtler treatment compared to the stylized gen-
dered imagery often employed in real-life propaganda materials and media
coverage. Second, our experiment provides only a single exposure, whereas in
reality an observer might encounter repeated stories or images of female com-
batants in news reports due to their novel presence in the conflict. That we
nevertheless find significant treatment effects underscores the potency of gen-
dered symbols in conflict.
While the results presented above demonstrate that female combatants can
exert a positive influence on external audience attitudes toward rebel groups,
they do not explain why observers’ attitudes vary depending on fighter gender.
Existing literature generally contends that observers tend to view female com-
batants as motivated less by self-interest and more by personal circumstance
compared to their male counterparts. We investigate the plausibility of this
contention by asking respondents to infer the motivations of the fighter profiled
in the vignette. Specifically, respondents were asked to evaluate (on a five-point
scale) how likely it was that the fighter joined the group for each of the fol-
lowing reasons: (1) she or he is strongly committed to the group’s ideology; (2)
she or he has a desire for thrill and adventure; and (3) she or he is interested in
profiting from the conflict.
As shown in Table 2, we find evidence that observers perceive that self-interest is
less likely to motivate women to take up arms than men. In both samples, respon-
dents perceived the female fighter as less motivated by greed. Moreover, Indonesian
respondents perceived that men are significantly more likely than females to join
armed groups out of a desire for thrill and adventure. These results provide support
for H3 by suggesting that observers view female fighters’ motivations as “purer” and
less opportunistic than men’s motivations.
Interestingly, across the samples, we find opposite effects for observers’ beliefs
about ideological motivations. Among Indonesian respondents, women are per-
ceived as less likely to have joined the rebel group for ideological reasons. This is
consistent with literature on gendered framing of conflict, which tends to portray
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female fighters as more motivated by personal experiences and hardship than as a
result of ideological extremism. US respondents, however, perceived female rebels
as significantly more likely to have joined for ideological reasons than men. This
difference may be due to the prevalence of more traditional gender norms in Indo-
nesia, which might lead respondents to believe that women participated in organized
violence only under extreme conditions rather than become they are motivated by
their beliefs. Still, the results are intriguing as they suggest that observers may
believe that women’s motives are nobler and less self-interested than male comba-
tants, as implied by traditional gender stereotypes. Further research could shed
additional light on cross-cultural variation in these norms.
Overall, these results provide causal evidence for the positive impact of female
fighters on audience interest and support, and they suggest that these effects are
driven, at least in part, by gender stereotypes about women’s motivations to partic-
ipate in political violence.12 Yet, like all experiments, they are limited in their
external validity. Moreover, evidence of impact on audience attitudes, on its own,
does not show that rebel groups gain strategic advantages from highlighting female
combatants. In the next section, we therefore turn to observational analysis, to
examine whether, cross-nationally, female fighters are associated with gains to rebel
groups in terms of external support.
Table 2. Beliefs about Fighter’s Motivations.
US Sample
Mean
ATE T-statisticControl (All Male) Treatment (Female)
Ideological commitment 3.96 4.24 .28 4.00**
Thrill and adventure 2.53 2.53 .00 0.01
Profit seeking 2.76 2.53 .23 2.46*
Indonesia Sample
Mean
ATE T-statisticControl (All Male) Treatment (Female)
Ideological commitment 4.10 3.99 .11 1.69***
Thrill and adventure 3.38 3.05 .33 3.65**
Profit seeking 3.46 2.96 .50 5.53**
Note: Mean score denotes the average view of respondents on a scale of 1 (very low) to 5 (very high).
N ¼ 792 for US sample, and 754 for Indonesia sample.
*p < .05.
**p < .01 (two-tailed test).
***p < .10.
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Female Combatants and External Support
Data and models. Based on the arguments presented above, we anticipate that the
factors that lead TNSAs to extend support to foreign rebel movements will differ
from those that contribute to state support for foreign rebels. More specifically, we
expect the presence of female combatants to increase the likelihood of support from
transnational actors because it legitimizes and humanizes the group, thereby increas-
ing audiences’ affinity for it. By contrast, we expect female combatants to have little
direct effect on the group’s success at securing support from a state actor because we
assume that state actions are more likely to be driven by strategic interests than by
sentiment or affinity. Instead, we hypothesized that female combatants have an
indirect effect on state support by mobilizing TNSAs.
In order to evaluate the influence of female fighters on state and TNSA support
for rebel groups, we employ data from the recently constructed Women in Armed
Rebellion Dataset (WARD; Wood and Thomas 2017). WARD includes a series of
related measures that account for the presence and estimated prevalence of female
fighters within a sample of contemporary rebel movements drawn from the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Dyadic Dataset (Harbom, Melander, and Walens-
teen 2008). WARD bases its conceptualization of female combatants on definitions
commonly employed by the United Nations and defines female combatants as
“women and girls who participated in armed conflicts as active combatants using
arms.”13 Female members of armed groups that occupy support roles (e.g., cooks,
nurses, couriers, porters) are therefore excluded from the WARD measures.
We employ the binary measure of female combatants included in WARD.14 We
chose this measure over the categorical indicator because a relatively small number
of female fighters should suffice to attract support from an external audience. The
variable female combatant therefore indicates whether or not a given group included
any number of female fighters at any point during its rebellion against the state. The
measures included in the WARD are time-invariant and thus contain only a single
observation for each rebel group included in the data set.
Information on TNSA support comes from the Nonstate Actor (NSA) Dataset
(Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2013). This variable captures both tacit and
explicit forms of support provided by actors such as global religious organizations,
international solidarity networks and NGOs, and diaspora organizations (Salehyan,
Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011). Tacit support includes public statements of
sympathy or solidarity and may also include lobbying, protests, and solidarity state-
ments while explicit support indicates that a transnational actor provided financial or
material support to the rebels (e.g., food, medical supplies). Groups that received
either form of support from such actors are coded as 1 and groups that received no
such support are coded as 0. State support reflects all cases in which a foreign state
provided military or nonmilitary support to a rebel group. Groups that received such
support from an external state are coded as 1 and groups that received no such
support are coded as 0. This variable is taken from the NSA Dataset.15 Combining
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the WARD with the NSA Dataset produces a sample consisting of 280 group-level
observations active between 1964 and 2009.
We include a number of other potentially relevant confounders in our models. We
first account for rebel group political ideology. We include this control both because
previous studies have found that group ideology is a principal predictor of the
presence of female fighters and because TNSAs are more likely to support rebels
that espouse similar ideologies to their own. We specifically account for nationalist,
leftist, or religious ideologies using data from Wood and Thomas (2017).16 We also
control for the presence of Transborder Ethnic Kinship because the presence of
ethnic kin groups in neighboring countries creates opportunities and incentives for
rebel support. This binary variable is taken from the Transborder Ethnic Kin Dataset
(Vogt et al. 2015). It is coded 1 if the rebel organization in question fought on behalf
of a specific ethnic group whose settlement area was split by one or more interna-
tional borders and 0 otherwise.
We also control for several factors that may be strategically relevant to potential
external sponsors, particularly foreign states. The binary measure weak rebels, taken
from the NSA Dataset, indicates whether the aggregate military capabilities of the
organization were “much weaker” than those of the state. We control for interna-
tional rivalry because a history of conflict or militarized competition creates incen-
tives for foreign states to sponsor rebellions inside an adversary’s borders as a way to
achieve policy goals. This indicator is based on data from Thompson and Dreyer
(2011) and reflects whether or not the state in which the rebellion occurred was
involved in a militarized international rivalry at any point during the window of time
the rebel group was active. Separatist conflict reflects whether or not the armed
group’s objectives included territorial autonomy or independence from the central
state.17 We also control for the presence of other factions in the conflict state that
might compete or external support. Rebel factions represents the maximum number
of armed factions active within the conflict state during the life span of the rebel
group under observation. Duration represents the natural log of the number years
since the onset of the group’s challenge to the state. Information on separatism, rebel
factions, and conflict duration are constructed from information in the UCDP Dyadic
Dataset.
Finally, we control for three state-level characteristics that might influence a
rebel group’s ability to establish connections with external actors. The variable
democratic is based on information in the Polity IV Dataset (Marshall, Gurr, and
Jaggers 2017). We code this indicator 1 if the modal value of the conflict country’s
Polity2 score during the years in which the group was active was 6 or higher and 0
otherwise. Population size and GDPpc reflect the natural log of the average popu-
lation size and per capita GDP of the country during the years of the conflict. Data
for both variables come from Gleditsch (2002).
Cross-national results. We estimate logit models to evaluate our hypotheses and pres-
ent average marginal effects based on those results in Figure 1.18 We illustrate the
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results for TNSA support in the left-hand panel and the results for external state
support in the right-hand panel. The results suggest that the presence of female
combatants increases the probability that the group receives support from a TNSA
by approximately 21 percent. The effect is statistically significant, providing support
for H4a. The results further indicate that the presence of female fighters exerts only
an indirect influence on the probability that rebels receive state support. The variable
female combatants is not a significant predictor of external state support. However,
the presence of TNSA support is significant and is associated with a 25 percent
increase in the likelihood that a rebel group receives support from a foreign state.
This result is consistent with H4b. To the extent that female fighters increase the
odds that rebels secure support from TNSAs, they may therefore exert an indirect
effect on state support.
We explore this relationship in greater depth by following recent efforts to inves-
tigate empirical relationships among the interrelated steps of the “boomerang mod-
el” (e.g., Allendoerfer, Murdie, and Welch 2020). The results from a mediation
analysis using the method described by Hicks and Tingley (2011) provide further
support for H4b. Principally, we find that female combatants does not directly affect
external state support. However, the positive and statistically significant average
mediation effect implies an indirect link to state support: more than 30 percent of the
Female Combatants
Weak Rebels
Leftist
Religious
Nationalist
Ethnic Kinship
Interstate Rivalry
Democracy
Population
GDPpc
Rebel Factions
Duration
TNSA Support
-.5 0 .5 -.5 0 .5
TNSA Support State Support
Figure 1. Effects of female combatants on external support for rebellion. Average marginal
effects with 90 percent confidence intervals. N ¼ 268.
Manekin and Wood 1655
relationship between female combatants and external state support is mediated by
the presence of TNSA support.19
Consistent with our expectations, the results in Figure 1 also reveal that the
factors associated with the presence of transnational support differ from those
associated with external state support. For example, the presence of female comba-
tants, ideological orientation, the presence of a co-ethnic population in a neighboring
state, and the pursuit of separatist goals are significant predictors of a group’s like-
lihood of securing support from TNSAs. Yet, none of these variables significantly
predict state support. Conversely, rivalries exert a large and significant influence on
state support but apparently have no bearing on TNSA support. Interestingly, the
variable accounting for the political institutions of the conflict state appears to exert
opposite effects, with democracy increasing the odds of TNSA support but reducing
state support. These results partly support our claims that governments are more
likely to be motivated by strategic interests (e.g., rivalries), while TNSAs are more
likely to be motivated by nonstrategic ideational factors (e.g., shared kinship, group
ideology).
These results are based on observational data and therefore subject to limitations
on the ability to infer causality. Nonetheless, that they are consistent with our
experimental results increases our confidence in our interpretation of the findings
and in our broader arguments about the relationship between the presence of female
combatants and external nonstate actor support for armed groups.
Heterogeneous effects by belief in traditional gender norms. While we find evidence from
diverse empirical contexts to support our hypotheses, we acknowledge that these
effects may not extend to all settings. In particular, audiences that embrace tradi-
tional gender norms, such as conservative religious communities, may perceive
mixed-gender rebel groups as less legitimate or view female combatants as a threat
to traditional norms. Indeed, groups that espouse such ideologies are often already
negatively disposed to deploying women in combat (e.g., Thomas and Bond 2015).
Large-scale recruitment of female combatants can lead to backlash from local con-
stituencies in some cases.20 This suggests that the effects of female combatants may
vary across contexts.
To investigate these propositions, we conduct a series of supplementary analyses.
We first consider how the existing values or beliefs of individual observers might
influence their attitudes toward female fighters. In our Indonesia sample, we asked
respondents to indicate (on a four-point scale) the extent to which they believed
Islamic law should serve as the basis for national law.21 While an imperfect proxy
for traditionalist or conservative gender attitudes, this variable should provide some
indication of respondent preferences for traditionalist social norms. If individuals
who hold extremely conservative views are offended or threatened by the presence
of female fighters, we should observe significantly lower levels of support for the
group that includes female combatants among the subset of respondents that most
strongly believe that Indonesia should be governed by Islamic law.
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To assess the possibility of a heterogeneous treatment effect, we interact the
variable support for Islamic law with the treatment in a series of linear regression
models. The marginal effects plots of the interaction presented in Figure 2 suggest
that the mixed gender treatment significantly increased interest and perceptions of
the legitimacy of the group’s goals/tactics among respondents who expressed the
least support for Islamic law (categories 1 and 2). For respondents that expressed the
highest level of support (category 4), which we expect to possess the most traditional
gender attitudes, the effect was not significant. However, there is no strong evidence
for a backlash effect. Given the small sample size and the crudeness of the measure
we use to account for traditionalist gender attitudes, these results should be viewed
as preliminary. However, they potentially demonstrate the limits of the argument
and highlight the conditions under which female combatants might exert a greater or
weaker influence on observer attitudes.
We also leverage our observational data to investigate possible variation in the
effect of female combatants across different types of nonstate sponsors. As with
individual attitudes, organizations are likely to vary in terms of their willingness to
extend support to armed groups that include female fighters. Particularly, highly
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Figure 2. Effect of treatment by support for Islamic law. Average marginal effects with
90 percent confidence intervals. N ¼ 609.
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conservative or traditionalist groups might be less inclined to support a rebel move-
ment if they include female fighters in their ranks. To examine this possibility, we
disaggregate the TNSA support variable into four nonmutually exclusive categories
using information provided in the case narratives accompanying the NSA Dataset.22
Using this information, we identify whether a given rebel group received support
from the following types of transnational actors: Islamist movements, Diaspora/co-
ethnic communities, NGOs, and other actors (e.g., international institutions and
foreign political parties). While these categories are quite coarse, they should allow
us to evaluate the extent to which the influence of female combatants on external
support varies across actors of different types, and particularly, whether female
combatants produce a backlash among extremely conservative populations (e.g.,
transnational Islamist movements).
The results of these exploratory analyses are presented in Figure 3.23 Each model
uses the same controls included in the main model presented above. As with the
individual level model, we observe no evidence of backlash. The effect of female
combatants on the odds of securing support from a transnational Islamist movements
is negative but insignificant. In the case of Diaspora/co-ethnic communities, we
observe a positive relationship that falls just short of statistical significance. By
contrast, the presence of female combatants appears to be positively and signifi-
cantly related to the odds that a group attains external support from NGOs and other
types of transnational actors. Though preliminary, these results suggest that while
there is no backlash effect among conservative activist communities, female com-
batants are most likely to help rebel movements achieve support from less conser-
vative, Western-oriented NGOs and solidarity movements.
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Figure 3. Effect of female combatants on sources of transnational support. Average marginal
effects with 90 percent confidence intervals. N (by model) ¼ 208, 266, 212, and 265.
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Discussion and Conclusion
This article makes two notable contributions to the emerging literature on the roles
and implications of female combatants in armed intrastate conflicts. First, we present
systematic empirical evidence to support the argument that female combatants can
improve audience perceptions of the legitimacy of an armed group and its goals.
While this claim is common in the existing literature, there has been little effort to
directly evaluate the influence of female combatants or gendered imagery on target
audiences. Second, we extend this argument to explicitly link the proposed influence
of gendered images and symbols on audience attitudes to willingness of external
actors to extend tacit or explicit support to armed groups. Through their ability to
influence audience attitudes about the groups for which they fight, the visible pres-
ence of female fighters increases the likelihood that the group receive support from
TNSAs such as transnational activist movements and foreign NGOs.
To evaluate the validity of the theoretical relationships discussed above, we
employed a combination of experimental and observational data, drawing on the
respective advantages of each to bolster our findings. Results from two survey
experiments conducted in culturally and geographically distinct regions of the world
provide support for our argument linking the presence of female combatants to
increased perceptions of group legitimacy among foreign audiences. Moreover,
we find evidence for a causal mechanism we believe underlies this relationship:
observers attribute different motivations to women and men who participate in
political violence. Particularly, respondents were more likely to believe that men
are motivated by self-interest while women exhibited comparatively “purer”
motives. Moving beyond our experimental settings, we analyze the substantive
impact that female combatants can have on armed conflicts. We found a strong
relationship between the presence of female combatants and the likelihood that an
armed group successfully secured support from a nonstate transnational actor. Con-
sistent with our overall expectations, we find no evidence that female combatants
directly influence rebel success in acquiring support from foreign governments.
However, they can solicit government support indirectly through their effects on
nonstate actors.
While our study focused on the effects of female fighters on external audiences,
the effect on domestic audiences represents an interesting related question. On the
one hand, existing research suggests that stereotypes of women as peaceful are
deeply entrenched across most societies, and there is some evidence to suggest that
the presence of female fighters increases sympathy for the group among domestic
audiences (e.g., Alison 2009; Viterna 2014). On the other hand, there may be some
audiences for whom women in combat are anathema to basic beliefs. Our explora-
tory analysis suggests that female fighters do not increase sympathy for a rebel group
among highly conservative audiences in Indonesia and are not associated with
support from Islamist movements. However, we find no evidence for a backlash
effect in either instance. Beyond differences in gender stereotypes, domestic
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audiences may view the integration of female fighters differently based on their
attitudes toward the conflict itself. For example, audiences that have been exposed to
conflict-related violence may react differently to gender frames. The question of
how gender affects domestic audiences is thus likely to vary by context and is a
fruitful topic for future research.
Most importantly, these results provide strong evidence of the substantive impact
of female combatants on armed conflicts, demonstrating that groups’ decisions to
recruit, train, and deploy women in combat may affect the conflict space and the
fortunes of armed groups in important ways. Our study suggests that female com-
batants can assist rebel groups in securing external support. Such support is critically
important to rebel movements because the ability to garner support and attract allies
has direct bearing on the odds that the group survives and achieves its political
objectives. Examining the implications of female combatants represents a theoreti-
cally interesting and substantively important area of inquiry that has thus far been
largely ignored by conflict scholars.
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Notes
1. Among the minority of groups that include female combatants, women typically consti-
tute fewer than 5 percent of combatants (see Wood and Thomas 2017).
2. For example, see the sixth section of the supporting information (SI).
3. Qualtrics aggregates respondents from a number of online panel partners. To create a
sample, it randomly selects panel respondents after proportioning it to the general
population.
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4. This survey experiment builds on two earlier studies we conducted in 2016. We summar-
ize the results of these analyses in the fourth section of the SI to demonstrate the con-
sistency of the results across multiple samples.
5. A few demographic questions were altered based on context.
6. Qualtrics uses quota sampling to match the sample to US demographics for gender, race,
age, and education. Our Indonesian sample is balanced on gender, which is most theore-
tically relevant for our study, but overrepresents young and educated respondents.
7. Though their numbers on the frontlines were small, women directly participated in both
insurgencies and played important roles in the clandestine supply and information net-
works of the respective armed groups (Franks 1996; Schulze 2003).
8. See the first section of the SI for the full question wording in both languages and images
used.
9. Balance tests (see the third section of the SI) indicate that our treatment and control
groups are balanced on a series of sociodemographic covariates.
10. As a manipulation check, the survey concluded with a true/false/don’t know question
about whether the fighter interviewed was male or female. Around 90 percent of those
assigned to the treatment conditions correctly identified the fighter as female. Following
Aronow, Baron, and Pinson (2019), we retain respondents who failed these checks to
avoid biasing effect estimates.
11. We report significance levels for one-tailed tests for the results in Table 1 because the
hypotheses associated with these results are directional. We report significance levels for
two-tailed tests in Table 2 because we do not generate directional hypotheses regarding
these relationships.
12. As supplementary analysis, we also examine whether the effects of female fighters vary
by respondent gender (see the fourth section of the SI). We find that among US respon-
dents, effects are generally stronger among women. We do not find substantial differ-
ences in the Indonesian sample for most results.
13. The codebook and supplementary information are available here: https://reedmwood.
com/home-page/women-in-armed-rebellion-dataset-ward/.
14. This measure excludes cases in which women only participated directly in conflict
violence as suicide bombers. Nonetheless, the results are similar when using alternative
Women in Armed Rebellion Dataset (WARD) indicators.
15. Because our data set is cross-sectional, we calculate the mean or model values of time
varying control variables.
16. We update the ideology indicators for cases not included in the original WARD using
information in the Non-state Armed Groups Dataset (San Acka 2016).
17. In additional models, we interact Separatist Conflict with Female Combatants in order to
maintain consistency with the experimental analysis (Figure 1 in the SI).
18. Full results for these models and additional specifications are included in the eighth
section of the SI.
19. In the tenth section of the SI, we also report the results of a model interacting female
combatants and TNSA support. They show that female fighters are associated with state
support only in the presence of TNSA support.
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20. See Wood (2019, 38-41) for a discussion and examples.
21. This question was asked only of Muslim respondents, which constitute more than 80
percent of the sample. The categories range from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree.”
22. The case narratives typically only provide short descriptions of the source of support; we
therefore consulted additional sources where the type of supporter was unclear. Narra-
tives are available here: http://ksgleditsch.com/data/NSAEX_casedesc.pdf.
23. Full regression results are presented in Table 15 in the SI.
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